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Abstract. Analyzing security protocols is an ongoing research in the
last years. Different types of tools are developed to make the analysis
process more precise, fast and easy. These tools consider security pro-
tocols as black boxes that can not easily be composed. It is difficult or
impossible to do a low-level analysis or combine different tools with each
other using these tools. This research uses Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) to
analyze OSAP trusted computing protocol. The OSAP protocol is mod-
eled in different levels and it is analyzed using state space method. The
produced model can be combined with other trusted computing protocols
in future works.
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1 Introduction
Security protocols have been an ongoing research in the last years. Errors found
in famous protocols like Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK)[19], 17 years
after it was introduced, have made usage of automated tools for protocol verifica-
tion more evident. Tools like AVISPA[26], CASPER[20], ProVerif[4], Hermes[5],
NRL protocol analyzer[21], Isabelle[23], PRISM[18], Athena[24], Securify[10] and
Scyther[11] create a formal model to verify security properties.
In [22] a number of emerging issues in protocol analysis is listed. One of them
is high fidelity. Techniques usually behave with algorithms like black boxes that
a number of algebraic properties are included in them. However, many security
problems arise at lower levels of abstraction. They can come from interactions
of the protocol with crypto system, problems with other functions such as hash
functions.
The other issue is composability. Most of the analysis’s of cryptographic
works concentrate on the analysis of protocols that can be described by a single
sequence of messages and there is no loop or choice points. This problem is not
just a theoretical concern. The reported attack in [3] on an early version of SSL
is based on it.
2 Y.Seifi, S.Suriadi, E.Foo, C.Boyd
Both of the problems can be resolved using CPN modeling. The CPN models
can be created in different levels of abstraction. Hierarchical mechanism of CPN
is an effective method to design top-down or bottom-up models. Moreover, CPN
can model a combination of protocols or security properties of a specific protocol.
The CPN model can be extended to involve different levels of defined security
properties. They have the advantage of expandability as well. For example, it is
possible to combine secrecy definition in a security protocol with the definition of
security in communication components of the system. General purpose modeling
can help verification of different properties at the same time in a system. This
feature in new systems like trusted computing that different components are
interconnected to each other over a network, makes the analysis possible.
General purpose verification method such as Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) and
a tool like CPN/Tools. General modeling methods like CPN can model verifier-
defined system properties including security ones. CPN model can illustrate
system operations obviously. Its simulation tools provide trace and simulation
functionalities to check the correctness of the model. Finally, state space tools
and logics like ASK-CTL make the system verification possible.
Coloured Petri Nets is a graphical language used for design, specification
and simulation of variety of systems. It is specially used for the systems that
communication, resource sharing and synchronization are important in them.
Its typical examples of usage area are automated production systems, embedded
systems, distributed systems, communication protocols, VLSI chips and work-
flow analysis[15]. Whilst Petri Net is used to provide required notations for
modeling communication, synchronization, resource sharing and concurrency,
Standard ML (SML) is used to provide required primitives of data type defi-
nition and data manipulation required for created Petri Net model[16]. CPNs
combine functional programming language Standard ML with Petri Net to af-
ford both of their features. Detailed illustration of Standard ML, Petri nets and
CPN is beyond this report. The main objects of the CPN are illustrated in the
CPN modeling section.
Graphical modeling languages like CPN has the advantage of graphical user-
interface. The interface can demonstrate the system clearly. Moreover, the be-
havior of each CPN can be defined unambiguously using well defined semantics of
CPN. The offered hierarchical structure of the system by CPN is a powerful tool
to model large systems. The CPN can model time concepts that is not offered by
many of security analysis tools. A large number of state space creation, analysis
and reduction algorithms are designed for CPN models that makes analyzing
large CPN models possible.
This research investigates how CPN can be used to model and analyze a
security protocol in different levels. The hierarchical approach of CPN is used
to model a session of OSAP protocol in the highest level. Then any substitution
transition has been modeled to create models with more detail.To a number
of substitution transitions three levels of abstraction has been designed. In the
lowest level of abstraction the authentication property is defined for the OSAP
protocol. Then state space analysis is used to evaluate this property. The ASK-
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CTL logic is used to validate the results and to investigate whether they are
valid in all the state space time slots or not.
After the introduction the background section introduces authorization pro-
tocol, CPN modeling, state space analysis and ASK-CTL. Modeling OSAP using
CPN section illustrates how OSAP is modeled using CPN in CPN/Tools. Section
four shows how the model can be verified using state-space, how authentication
property is defined and how ASK-CTL can validate the results and authentica-
tion property.
2 Background
Trusted Computing (TC) is a new technology that will be the core of most of
the security systems in the next years. Trusted computing is defined by Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) as a computer system for which any entity inside the
system is responsible for supervision of system behavior to be the same as what is
predicted for it. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip is invented by TCG
to this aim. Trusted computing is considered by [17] as a technology trying to
answer two main questions:
1. Which software is running on a remote computer (remote attestation): For
example Microsoft can check which Microsoft programs have been installed
on a computer running in Australia.
2. How insurance can be provided that just using a specific software stack access
to stored secret is possible? (sealed memory)
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has been working from spring of 2003 to
create the building blocks of trusted platform. The result of these efforts is the
creation of a Trusted Platform Module(TPM) chip and its related standards.
TPM chip as the main outcome of the TCG adds “roots of trust” into computer
platform to establish a chain of trust (discussed in the next section). There are
currently three different roots of trust considered by TCG:
1. Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM): a computing engine that can com-
pute a measurement for all software on a system by hashing them.
2. Root of Trust for Storage (RTS): a secure storage that can store RTM values.
3. Root of trust for Reporting (RTR): a reliable mechanism to report values
stored by RTS to other entities.
To provide access to these roots of trust different protocols are designed. One
of the most important type of them are authorization protocols. They provide
access to the TPM secrets. They will be illustrated in more detail in the next
section. These protocols are one of the fundamental protocols of trusted com-
puting that are used before other protocols to check whether the user process
is eligible to have access to the TPM secrets or not. This makes the analysis of
them more important than the other types of protocols.
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coloured Petri Nets is introduced in [13–15]as a graphical language to model
and analyze concurrent systems. In [16] CPN has been considered as a lan-
guage to model and validate systems like communication protocols, software
and engineering systems. Practical implementations of using CPN in business
process modeling, manufacturing systems, agent system and workflow modeling
are available now. The complexity of modern system makes using CPN for sys-
tem modeling important. The CPN provides a visual model of system behavior
which makes formal analysis of it possible.
Kurt Jensen in [16] introduces insight, completeness and correctness as ben-
efits of creating a model. Creating a model for a system helps developers to be
more familiar with the system and leads to new insights into various aspects of
the system. CPN models are executable and to create these executable models,
specifications must be completely understood and they must be complete as well.
Creating this model helps designers to find gaps in definitions.
Executing a model and simulating it several times helps detect flaws and
errors by designers and to use results to improve correctness of the model. CPN
is used by variety of researchers in different fields of research. This popularity
provides more support for CPN and makes the modeling difficulties less. To
implement CPN models different tools can be used. The CPN/Tools has been
used to implement CPN models of this research. previous model in this report.
CPN/Tools is a free tool that its license can be obtained free of charge for
academic and commercial usage. This tool can simulate behavior of modeled
system. It is suitable for evaluating different properties of model using state-
space method or simulation-based performance analysis. A quick survey of using
this tool can be studied in [16].
2.1 Authorization protocols
Authorization protocols or TPM command validation protocols are one of the
most important categories of protocols defined by TCG in [25]. TCG enforces
all commands to the TPM that affect security, privacy or reveal platform secrets
to be authorized. Authorization is based on a secret provided by the caller as a
part of the command. There are a number of commands that do not need to be
authorized.
The entities in the computer platform can submit TPM specific API functions
to the TPM to be executed. These entities are processes, threads and embedded
controllers. To send a command a secure channel between the TPM and entity
will be created [25]. It is possible that different authorization sessions connect
to one TPM. For each session a unique session identifier, unique nonce for each
end point, a hash digest for messages which has been sent or received and an
ephemeral secret used to tie message exclusively to a specific object or to encrypt
message traffic if necessary will be allocated.
These sessions are established to provide authorized access to the TPM. Any
entity which decides to participate in an authorization session must provide a
pass-phrase which is used to authorize and authenticate it. The pass-phrase,
authorization secret or Attestation Identity Key (AIK) is a160-bit value which
Analysis of OSAP using CPN 5
is ideally random and non-guessable. The size of this secret is as the same as
the size of a SHA-1 operation result. After hashing secrets, salts and any other
values the result will be a fixed sized value called authorization data (authData).
Authorization data can be associated with any TPM object,TPM command,
TPM command interface or TPM itself. Before creating authData an authorized
session between the caller and TPM is created. Any message in an authorized
session consists of three different parts: message container, TPM command and
session state. Message container identifies message type, size and its format.
TPM command contains command name, I/O parameters and return code of
command. The last part, session state, is storing session ID, control flag and
digest values of messages in the session.
TPM and caller before moving to any next step of protocol confirm validity
of message. To prevent replay attack a nonce is sent with each message. The
number of concurrent sessions is left as an implementation decision. However, it
is mandated by TCG Core Services (TCG), that this number must not be less
than three sessions. Moreover, any exchanged message between TPM and caller
must be atomic and before processing any request accepting other requests by
TPM is impossible. Authorization protocols have been designed in a manner
that never relies on security properties of communication protocols.When TPM
is communicating with other user process it always assumes them as un-trusted
in relation to itself[25].
Object-Specific Authorization Protocol (OSAP) OSAP is a challenge
and response protocol used by TPM object caller to demonstrate its knowledge
about authorization data. This protocol is used to provide access to just one
type of TPM object whilst Object-Independent Authorization Protocol (OIAP),
another TPM authorization protocol, can be used to admit requests for different
type of objects. A sample usage of this protocol that asks TPM to create a key
is illustrated in [6]. Figure 1 from the same source demonstrates the protocol
sequences.
Fig. 1. OSAP sequence diagram
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1. In the first step, the user process sets up an OSAP session. The goal of this
step is asking TPM to create a key based on a preloaded key in the TPM
named parent key. The handle of parent key is pkh (parent key handle) and
ad(pkh) is its authorization data. Both pkh and ad(pkh) are included in the
TPM OSAP and are sent to the TPM.
2. TPM, after receiving the TPM OSAP command, generates ne, n
osap
e and
assigns new session authorization handle ah. These new items are sent to
the user as the response.
3. The TPM and user process will calculate shared secret using hmac algorithm
and based on ad(pkh), nosape and n
osap
o .
4. The user process calls TPM CreateWrapKey function. The ah, pkh, no and
newauth are sent by this function to the TPM. To protect newauth, it is
XORed with SHA1(S, no). The keyed HMAC on S demonstrates knowledge
of storage root key authData.
5. When this command is received, the TPM checks the HMAC and creates
the new key. Then private key and new authData are put in an encrypted
package. The encrypted package and public key are put in keyblob. The
keyblob is returned by the TPM and is authenticated with a HMAC. The
hmac is created with no and n
′
ononces and is keyed on S .
2.2 CPN modeling
The CPN models are depicted as graphical drawings composed of places, tran-
sitions, arcs and inscriptions. Places are shown using circles and ellipses. They
demonstrate different states of the system. Transitions shown by rectangles de-
scribe actions. For example, sending a packet in a network is a transition that
changes state of network (shown by a named place in CPN) from place 1 to place
2. The transitions and places are connected to each other using arrows called
arcs. For any arc, an arc expression can be written in CPN ML language to
define how the state of net changes after occurring the transition. Places can be
marked with a set of markers called tokens. For each of these tokens a data value
from a given type has been considered. The data value of each token is called
the token colour . The set of all the tokens that can exist in a place is defined as
its colour set and is written below the place using an inscription (written text
in the CPN ML programming language). The value of each variable specifies
its binding . The number of tokens and their colours in all the individual places
specifies marking of the CPN model. The number of tokens in just one place
and their colours specify marking of that place. Most of the times next to each
place another inscription except its colour set is written that determines the
initial marking of place.
For each transition a pair consisting of transition and binding of all the
variables of transition is called binding elements. For each transition it is possible
to define a Boolean expression named guard that when evaluated to true the
binding elements will be enabled otherwise binding elements are disabled and
can not be occurred.
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Tokens can move between places and transitions using arcs. However, when
tokens need to move between different pages of model, arcs are not useful. Port
and socket places are designed to move tokens in complete models. The place
that constitutes the interface through which one page exchanges tokens with
the others is an input/output port. The input sockets are the input places of
substitution transitions, while their output places are output socket . The other
method of moving tokens between different pages is fusion set . Fusion sets glue a
number of places in one or more CPN pages together. They all create a compound
place across the model.
Transitions initially are disabled and when all of their input tokens are pro-
vided they are enabled. Then output arcs that are connected to the transition
move the input token to the output places places. It is possible to consider
special inscriptions named guards for transitions. This inscriptions are boolean
expressions that when they are evaluated to true the transition can be enabled.
Otherwise even if all the input tokens are provided the transition can not be
enabled.
To execute a CPN model different occurring steps and the reached inter-
mediate markings must be described by means of an occurrence sequence. If a
marking via an occurrence sequence is reachable and it starts from the initial
marking then it is called a reachable marking [16].
2.3 State Space Analysis
Simulation of a CPN model just analysis a finite number of executions. This
helps validating, detecting and finding errors of CPN model as well as increasing
confidence about the model. It can demonstrate model is working correctly.
However, using that it is impossible to guarantee correctness of model with
100% of certainty because all the possible executions are not covered [16].
Full state space calculates all possible executions of the model. It calculates
all reachable markings and binding elements of the CPN model. The result is
represented in a directed graph where its nodes are set of reachable markings
and the arcs are corresponding to the occurring binding elements.
State space analysis or model checking is mainly used for model based verifi-
cation of concurrent systems. It is applied successfully in many formal models as
the analysis method. State space explosion is its main limitation. It means that,
there are a large number of reachable states in the state spaces of the system
that they can not easily be handled by the available computing resources like
CPU and memory. Designing new methods to optimize and reduce the number
of states in an state space is an active area of research. These methods are led
to design a large collection of state space reduction methods. The invention of
these methods has made analysis of large scale industrial systems possible.
In most cases after producing full state spaces the Strongly Connected Com-
ponent Graph (SCC-graph)is generated. This graph is derived from the state
space graph. The SCC-graph nodes are subgraphs called Strongly Connected
Components(SCC). Disjoint division of the nodes in the state space creates the
SCC. This division is in a manner that two state space nodes are in the same
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SCC if and only if they are mutually reachable. This means that a path exists
in the state space from the first node to the second node and vice versa. The
CPN/Tools uses the SCC-graph to determine standard behavioral properties of
the model. The structure of the SCC-graph can provide information about the
behavior of the model [16]. To create this graph a special toolbox is designed in
CPN simulation and analysis tools such as CPN Tools.
2.4 What is ASK/CTL
State spaces of coloured Petri nets provide a number of properties that can
be evaluated. Temporal logics like CTL are also convenient for specifying CPN
properties or for defining new properties for them [7]. CTL provides a model of
time that its structure is like a tree. In this structure the future is not determined
and different paths can occur in the future. Any of the branches might be an
actual path that is realized.Software applications like model checkers use CTL
in formal verification of hardware or software artifacts. They can determine
whether an artifact possess safety or liveness properties or not. ASK-CTL is an
extension of CTL [9] temporal logic implemented in CPN/Tools. This extension
takes into account both the state information and arc information. The ASK-
CTL statement is interpreted over the state space of the coloured Petri net
model. Then the model checker of CPN/Tools checks the formula over the state
space and defines whether it is true or false. For more information about the
ASK-CTL, [8] can be studied. This research uses ASK-CTL to define and verify
the authentication property of the OSAP protocol.
3 Modeling OSAP using CPN
To create the CPN model of the OSAP protocol the following steps are followed:
1. A CPN model for the protocol and attacker is designed and implemented.
This stage consists of a number of steps including:
(a) Identifying all the participating entities of the protocol and modeling
them in the CPN modeling tool(for this research CPN/Tools)
(b) Designing and implementing required colour sets, variables and ML func-
tions.
2. Simulating the CPN model to find its bugs.
3. Analyzing the model using state space
4. Evaluating the analysis results to investigate whether designated places (based
on the definition of the evaluation property) contain predicted tokens or not.
5. Validating the results using ASK-CTL to be sure that the evaluation out-
comes are valid in ll the time slots of the analysis.
The mentioned steps are illustrated in more detail in the next paragraphs and
sub-sections.
To design and implement the CPN model of the OSAP protocol all the
entities participating in one protocol are identified. Three main entities are con-
sidered in this protocol: user, TPM and intruder. To model messages sent and
received by these entities the following colour sets are defined:
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1 colset csTERMS = with null |ah |ahi |no osap |ne |ne osap |ne osap1
|no |ne1 |ni1 |ni2 |pkh user |pkh tpm |pkh i |
keyblob |keyblobi |pkh authdata |newauth user |authdatai ;
This colour set defines all the terms used in the protocol. These terms are
components of each sent and received message and it does not allow other
terms to be used. The terms ending with ‘tpm’ are created or stored by the
TPM. The ones ending with ‘user’ are created or stored by the user. The
existence of letter‘i’ at the end of the term, means that the term has been
created by the intruder.
2 colset csATTACK = with posattack |negattack;
The csATTACK colour set determines whether an attack has occurred or
not. When an attack has occurred a token with the value of posattack is put
in a designated place. When no attack has occurred a token with the value
of negattack is put in the designed place.
3 colset csSEQ = with user1 |user2 |user3 |user4
|user41 |user42 |user43 |user5 |int1 |int2 |int3 |int4 |intx3
|tpm1 |tpm2 |tpm3 |tpm4 |tpm5 |err |endses;
The state space explosion is one of the most important problems of modeling
protocols by CPN. To prevent this problem csSEQ colour set is designed to
define in any state which transitions can be run. When in a typical state the
user1 transition should be enabled, all the other transitions will be deacti-
vated to decrease the state space nodes.
4 colset csAUTH HANDLE = subset csTERMS with [ah,ahi];
This colour set defines which authorization handles can be created or used.
The ‘ah’ is used by TPM and the user. The ‘ahi’ is another authorization
handle that is faked by the intruder.
5 colset csNONCE = subset csTERMS with [no osap, ne, ne osap, no, ne1, ni1, ni2];
This colour set defines all the nonces that are used or created by the user,
TPM and intruder.
6 colset csPUBKH = subset csTERMS with [pkh user, pkh tpm, pkh i];
This colour set defines the public key handle used by the user, TPM and
intruder.
7 colset csKEYBLOB = subset csTERMS with [keyblob,keyblobi];
This colour set defines two terms: the first one is used by the TPM and the
user and the second one is faked by the intruder.
8 colset csAUTH DATA = subset csTERMS with [pkh authdata, newauth user, authdatai];
This colour set defines the authorization data that is created by the TPM
or is faked by the intruder.
9 colset csOSAP MSG = product csPUBKH * csNONCE;
In the first exchange of the protocol shown in figure 7 format of the sent
message is defined by this colour set.
10 colset csOSAP RESPONSE = product csAUTH HANDLE * csNONCE * csNONCE;
The format of the TPM response to the OSAP message (the 2nd interchange
of figure 7) is defined by the csOSAP RESPONSE.
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01 colset csTERMS = with null | ah | ahi | no_osap |
ne | ne_osap | ne_osap1 | no | ne1 |
ni1 | ni2 | pkh_user | pkh_tpm | pkh_i |
keyblob | keyblobi | pkh_authdata |
newauth_user | authdatai;
02 colset csATTACK = with posattack | negattack;
03 colset csSEQ = with user1 | user2 |
user3 | user4 | user41 | user42 |
user43 | user5 | int1 | int2 | int3 |
int4 | intx3 | tpm1 |tpm2 | tpm3 |
tpm4 | tpm5 | err | endses;
04 colset csAUTH_HANDLE = subset csTERMS with [ah,ahi];
05 colset csNONCE = subset csTERMS with [no_osap,
ne, ne_osap, no, ne1, ni1, ni2];
06 colset csPUBKH = subset csTERMS with
[pkh_user, pkh_tpm, pkh_i];
07 colset csKEYBLOB = subset csTERMS with
[keyblob,keyblobi];
08 colset csAUTH_DATA = subset csTERMS with
[pkh_authdata,newauth_user,authdatai];
09 colset csOSAP_MSG = product
csPUBKH *
csNONCE;
10 colset csOSAP_RESPONSE = product
csAUTH_HANDLE *
csNONCE *
csNONCE;
11 colset csSHARED_SECRET = product
csAUTH_DATA *
csNONCE *
csNONCE;
12 colset csXOR_OUTPUT = product
csSHARED_SECRET *
csNONCE *
csAUTH_DATA;
13 colset csHMAC_OUTPUT = product
csSHARED_SECRET *
csNONCE *
csNONCE;
14 colset csWRAPKEY_INPUT = product
csAUTH_HANDLE *
csPUBKH *
csNONCE *
csXOR_OUTPUT;
15 colset csWRAPKEY_MSG = product
csWRAPKEY_INPUT *
csHMAC_OUTPUT;
16 colset csWRAPKEY_RESPONSE = product
csKEYBLOB *
csNONCE *
csHMAC_OUTPUT;
17 colset csINTDB = union
fipubkh : csPUBKH +
finonce1 : csNONCE +
finonce2 : csNONCE +
finonce_in : csNONCE +
fiauth_handle : csAUTH_HANDLE +
fixor_output : csXOR_OUTPUT +
fihmac_output : csHMAC_OUTPUT +
fikeyblob : csKEYBLOB +
fiosap_msg : csOSAP_MSG +
fiosap_res : csOSAP_RESPONSE +
fiwrapkey_msg : csWRAPKEY_MSG +
fiwrapkey_rsp : csWRAPKEY_RESPONSE +
fiwrapkey_input : csWRAPKEY_INPUT +
fiss : csSHARED_SECRET +
finewauth : csAUTH_DATA;
Fig. 2. List of CPN model colour sets
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11 colset csSHARED SECRET = product csAUTH DATA * csNONCE * csNONCE;
The TPM and the user are both able to create a shared secret. The csSHARED SECRET
colour set is used to define the format of the secret.
12 colset csXOR OUTPUT = product csSHARED SECRET * csNONCE * csAUTH DATA;
This is a colour set designed to temporarily store the result of the XOR
function.
13 colset csHMAC OUTPUT = product csSHARED SECRET * csNONCE * csNONCE;
This is a colour set designed to temporarily store the result of the HMAC
function.
14 colset csWRAPKEY INPUT = product csAUTH HANDLE * csPUBKH * csNONCE * csXOR OUTPUT;
This colour set stores all the inputs of the TPM CreateWrapKey function.
15 colset csWRAPKEY MSG = product csWRAPKEY INPUT * csHMAC OUTPUT;
The message sent in exchange number 3 of the protocol is sent by the user
to the TPM and is stored in this colour set.
16 colset csWRAPKEY RESPONSE = product csKEYBLOB * csNONCE * csHMAC OUTPUT;
The response of the TPM to TPM CreatWrapKey function is stored in a
message of type csWRAPKEY RESPONSE.
17 colset csINTDB = union fipubkh : csPUBKH+ finonce1 : csNONCE + finonce2 : csNONCE + fi-
nonce in : csNONCE + fiauth handle : csAUTH HANDLE +fixor output : csXOR OUTPUT +
fihmac output : csHMAC OUTPUT + fikeyblob : csKEYBLOB + fiosap msg : csOSAP MSG
+ fiosap res : csOSAP RESPONSE +fiwrapkey msg : csWRAPKEY MSG + fiwrapkey rsp :
csWRAPKEY RESPONSE +fiwrapkey input : csWRAPKEY INPUT +fiss : csSHARED SECRET
+ finewauth : csAUTH DATA;
The intruder has a database in which stores all his knowledge. This database
is a location to accumulate all the sent and received messages through
intruder. It also stores the initial knowledge of the intruder. The colour
set csINTDB is designed for this purpose. The initial value of intruder’s
database is shown in figure 3. In this figure the part 1‘fiauth handle(ahi)
means that one token with value of ahi should be put in the fiauth handle
field of intruder’s database. The other fields have the same meaning. For
example, 1‘finonce1(ni1) means that a nonce with value of ni1 is put in the
finonce1 field of the database.
Variables that are used in CPN model are shown in figure 4.
1‘fikeyblob(keyblobi) ++
1‘fiauth_handle(ahi) ++
1‘finonce1(ni1) ++
1‘finonce2(ni2) ++
1‘finewauth(authdatai) ++
1‘fipubkh(pkh_i) ++
1‘fiss(authdatai,ni1,ni2)
Fig. 3. Initial value of the intruder’s database
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var e : UNIT;
var vseq : csSEQ;
var tmpstr : STRING;
var vosap_res : csOSAP_RESPONSE;
var vne, vne1, vnonce1, vnonce2 , vne_osap, vne_osap1, vno, vno_osap : csNONCE;
var vah : csAUTH_HANDLE;
var vosap_msg : csOSAP_MSG;
var vauthdata, vnewauth : csAUTH_DATA;
var vss: csSHARED_SECRET;
var vxor_output : csXOR_OUTPUT;
var vwrapkey_input,
vwrapkey_output: csWRAPKEY_INPUT;
var vwrapkey_msg: csWRAPKEY_MSG;
var vwrapkey_rsp : csWRAPKEY_RESPONSE;
var vhmac_output,
vhmac_user,
vhmac_tpm: csHMAC_OUTPUT;
var vkeyblob:csKEYBLOB;
var vpkh,
vkh : csPUBKH;
Fig. 4. List of model variables
OSAP CPN model
The next step, after the colour set definition is to design the CPN models of
the user, intruder and TPM. Figure 5 demonstrates the OSAP protocol com-
posed of four different exchanges. In any of them TPM and the user are either
the sender or receiver, whilst the intruder acts as both the sender and receiver.
The protocol is started from the user and it finally ends with the user. To make
the model more readable and to simplify the modeling process, a hierarchical
CPN model is proposed. The first substitution transition of this model is used to
create the TPM OSAP (pkh, nosapo ) message. This message is sent to the TPM.
However, intruder can intercept this message. The Intruder 1 substitution tran-
sition is modeling the intruder functionality. Intruder is able to send original,
faked or changed message toward TPM or user. If it send the message to the
TPM, because of the specific format of the message it can be received by ‘Pro-
cess TPM OSAP’ substitution transition. When the message is sent to the user
again, this new message should be created by intruder. Intruder 2 substitution
transition is the only transition that can do this, thus the control of message
movement is changed from exchange #1 (figure 6 part (a) ) to the exchange #2
(figure 6 part (b)). When the message movement is like part (a) of figure 6 it is
processed by ‘Process TPM OSAP’ substitution transition. Then the message
of exchange #2 and shared secret S are created by ‘Send TPM OSAP Response’
and ‘Create Shared Secret TPM’ substitution transitions. The result will be sent
toward user. Intruder 2 is able to intercept the message exchange#2 in its way.
It can send faked message to the user or TPM again. However, because sending
new message directly from Intruder 2 to Intruder 3 and then to the TPM does
not affect the analysis of authentication property no path between Intruder 2
and Intruder 3 is created.
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The ‘Process TPM OSAP Response’ after processing the message creates the
shared secret. Then TPM CreateWrapKey(...) generates the 3rd exchange and
sends it to the TPM. What happens for this message is the same as exchange#1.
It is intercepted by Intruder 3. Then will be forwarded to either TPM and will
be processed by ‘Process TPM CreateWrapKey message’ or the Intruder 4 and
will be replaced by a faked message. If the message is processed by ‘Process
TPM CreateWrapKey message’ in the next step ‘Send TPM CreateWrapKey
Response’ will be executed otherwise after Intruder 4, ‘Process TPM CreateWrapKey(...)
Response’ is executed and the protocol will be ended. The main page of CPN
model shows the sequences of the OSAP protocol demonstrated in figure 7.
Fig. 5. Different exchanges of OSAP protocol
Fig. 6. message sequence in exchange #1 and exchange #2
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Fig. 7. OSAP protocol CPN model
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At the start of a protocol a token with a colour set of csSEQ and the colour
of user1, is stored in the place ‘Start Session 1 ’. This colour determines that
TPM OSAP(pkh, no osap) is the first substitution transition that should be
run. This token during the simulation and analysis moves from one transition
to the other and specifies the sequence of protocol run. The application of this
approach prevents concurrent run of transitions and dramatically decreases the
state space during the analysis.
U1 page
int1
(vpkh,
vno_osap)
vpkhvno_osap
vseq
TPM_OSAP
[vseq=user1]
CSO
GF_seq
csSEQ
TPM_OSAP
message
Out
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pkh_user
1`pkh_user
csPUBKH
no_osap_user
no_osap_user
1`no_osap
csNONCE
Call TPM_OSAP
In
csSEQ
Fig. 8. TPM OSAP(pkh, no osap) hierarchical transition CPN model
modeling TPM OSAP(pkh, no osap) substitution transition
The CPN model of TPM OSAP(pkh, no osap) substitution transition is shown
in figure 8. The TPM OSAP transition needs three tokens from the no osap user,
pkh user and call TPM OSAP places to be run. The token of the ‘call TPM OSAP’
place is provided from the ‘Start Session 1’ in the upper page of the model. This
token is the sequence token that will be passed through different transitions to
determine the correct sequence of the protocol. The value of this token is com-
pared by a specific constant (such as user1 ) provided by the guard [vseq=user1]
for transition TPM OSAP . When the value of this guard is true, the transition
can be run. After running the transition TPM OSAP, this token is moved to the
place CS (Current Sequence) with its colour changes to int1. This means that
int1 (the first transition of the intruder) is the next transition that should be
enabled. The content of the CS place has become a global value in the model us-
ing the GF seq fusion set. The other two required tokens, no osap and pkh user,
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are stored in their places as the initial value. This assumption is acceptable be-
cause the no osap is a nonce that is created by the user and the pkh user is a
public value that is known publicly. These two tokens are returned by double
arcs to their initial places after the TPM OSAP transition is enabled to provide
these tokens for other stages of the protocol when the user needs them again. As
no osap is used by the user to create the shared secret and to make the model as
simple and readable as possible, this place is tagged as a global fusion set named
no osap user. The result of TPM OSAP transition will be a message containing
input parameters of the TPM OSAP function.This message is sent to the place
‘TPM OSAP message’, then using the output port of this place it will be sent
back to the ‘Sent TPM OSAP message’ place in the main page of the OSAP
model.
modeling Intruder 1 substitution transition
The stored message in the ‘Sent TPM OSAP message’ place is transmitted over
the network. This provides the ability for the intruder to intercept the message.
The intruder model is based on the Dolev-Yao [27] model. The Dolev-Yao model
assumes the intruder is the medium that transmit all the messages and has the
most possible functions. It is able to intercept, store, change, forward and create
a message. The CPN model of the intruder in the OSAP model is demonstrated
in figure 9.
The OSAP message token enters the intruder sub-transition using the input
port ‘Sent TPM OSAP Packet ’. This token is stored in the ‘tmp storage’ place
and using the Tmp echg1 fusion set, it becomes public in the page of the intruder.
This makes creating the model simpler and prevents long arcs that cross each
other to be created. The ‘Store message parts in the DB’ transition stores token
parts, the parent key handle and the created nonce, in the inToken pubkh and
‘inToken nonce’ places. The content of these places will be stored in the intruder
database using the GF intDB fusion set. They are stored in the fipubkh and
finonce in fields of the intruder’s database respectively. The arc that connects
‘Store message parts in DB’ transition to the ‘tmp storage’ place is a double
arc that after a token is consumed by the transition returns it again to the
place. In some cases (that all the other required tokens to fir the transition are
provided) this makes a transition permanently enabled. To prevent this situation
the ‘JO 1’ enabler place, with just one token, is connected to the transitions.
This mechanism, just once, allows a transition to only run once. It is impossible
to run it again. The transitions located in the intruder’s page can only be run if
the sequencer token value is int1 and it has been sent from another page to this
page. To enforce this condition all the transitions have the guard [vseq=int1] .
This sequencer token using places with colour set csSEQ and with connected
arcs to them is moved from the first transition of the page to the last one.
The transition ‘Store Whole message in DB’ after ‘Store message parts in
DB’ transition stores the complete message in the intruder database. The ‘JO
2’ and ‘Sent TPM OSAP’ places connected to this transition act the same as
the illustrated ‘JO 1’ and ‘tmp storage’ places. The intruder, after storing the
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Fig. 9. The CPN model of the intruder located in the first message exchange of OSAP
protocol
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message parts or the complete message, can take several actions. These actions
are forwarding one of the stored messages to the TPM, creating new messages
and sending them to the TPM or bypassing the TPM completely. One of the
‘Forward stored message’, ‘Create new message’ or ‘Bypass TPM’ transitions
will be run randomly to do any of the mentioned actions. The sequence of the
protocol run is based on whether the first two transitions are run or the last one
will be different.
The result of forwarding a message or creating a message will be stored in
the ‘tmp output TPM OSAP message’ place. The ‘check attack’ transition will
check whether the new message is completely faked by the intruder or not. If the
attack has occurred, a posattack token will be put in the ‘int1 change’ place,
otherwise a token with negattack value will be added to the place. Function
fakedxchg1 in figure 10 checks whether the content of the sent token is fully
based on the intruder’s knowledge or not. If ‘yes’ then it means the token is
faked. If ‘no’ it means the token is genuine.
fun fakedxchg1 (vosap_msg: csOSAP_MSG):csATTACK =
case vosap_msg of
(pkh_i, ni1) => posattack
| (pkh_i, ni2) => posattack
| _ => negattack;
Fig. 10. function fakedxchg1 to check whether the exchange one is faked or not.
After verification the resulting output token will be sent to the ‘output
TPM OSAP message’ place. Then using the output port the token will be for-
warded to the TPM. The current sequence of the model will change to the tpm2
after the message is sent to the TPM. This change happens by sending tpm2
token to the CSO1 place. This change causes just the transitions of page T2
(first TPM substitution transition of TPM) to run .
The‘Bypass TPM’ transition is selected to be run when the intruder decides
not to send any message to the TPM. In this case the current sequence of the
model is put in the ‘Run intruder 2’ place. In CPN/Tools version 3.0.2 it is not
possible to connect a port directly to a fusion set. Thus a few transitions and
places are inserted between Intruder 1 and Intruder 2 transitions to connect
them to each other. As mentioned before in this model it is necessary to deter-
mine when each transition can be run. Thus, before entering to the Intruder 2 it
is assumed that the current state of the system to is still int1 . In page ‘Session 1
Run Intruder 2’ transition changes the current sequence of the model from int1
toint2 and triggers the Intruder 2 sub-transition. The model of the Intruder 2
sub-transition will be illustrated later.
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modeling ‘Process TPM OSAP’ substitution transition
The transition ‘Process TPM OSAP’, after receiving the TPM OSAP command
message in ‘Received TPM OSAP Message’ stores its parts in pkh tpm and
no osap tpm places. The CSI and CSO places are used to determine input and
output sequence tokens. When the transition is ended an empty token is put in
the ‘End processing TPM OSAP msg’ to transfer the protocol run to the next
sub-transition of the protocol, ‘Send TPM OSAP Response’ .
T1 page
tpm2vseq
e
(vpkh,vno_osap)
vpkh vno_osapPROCESS
TPM_OSAP 
Message
[vseq=tpm1]
CSO
GF_seq
csSEQ
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Received TPM_OSAP 
Message
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csOSAP_MSG
End processing
TPM_OSAP msg
Out
UNIT
Fig. 11. Substitution transition ‘Process TPM OSAP’
modeling ‘Send TPM OSAP Response’ substitution transition
TPM after processing TPM OSAP message prepares the response. The ‘Send
TPM OSAP Response’, figure 12, is a substitution transition that creates the
response. The required token to create the response is provided by ne osap tpm,
ne tpm, ah tpm places. The result will be stored in the ‘TPM OSAP Response’
place. The CSI and CSO places are used like before to change the current se-
quence of the model in the GF seq fusion set. ‘Start Seq 2’ place is used to the
transfer protocol run from the previous transition to the next one. The ‘Cre-
ate Shared Secret’ place is considered to transfer a sequence to a substitution
transition ‘Create Shared Secret TPM’ after triggering ‘SEND TPM OSAP RE-
SPONSE’ .
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Fig. 12. Send TPM OSAP Response substitution transition
modeling ‘Create Shared Secret TPM’ substitution transition
The ‘Create Shared Secret TPM’ substitution transition, figure 13 , produces
the shared secret of the TPM. To generate the shared secret required token are
fetched from ne osap tpm, no osap tpm, ‘authdata pkh tpm’ places. The double
arcs are used to return tokens after enabling ‘GENERATE SHARED SECRET
TPM’ transition to their places. The usage of CSI, CSO, ‘Create Shared Secret’
and ‘End Creating SC’ places are like previous places. The result will be stored
in the global fusion set ‘shared secret TPM’ .
When both of ‘Send TPM OSAP Response’ and ‘Create Shared Secret TPM’
substitution transitions of page Session 1 are run the ‘Hash is Done’ transition
in the page can be enabled. Then the response of the TPM to the TPM OSAP
message will be stored in the ‘Sent TPM OSAP Response’ place and Intruder 2
substitution transition, figure 14, will be run.
modeling Intruder 2 substitution transition
The page Int 2 contains the CPN model of the Intruder 2 substitution transi-
tion in page Session 1 . This intruder can be enabled from two different paths.
The former path is when the TPM is bypassed by the Intuder 1 substitution
transition. As the result of bypassing TPM there is no message send from the
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Fig. 13. Create Shared Secret TPM substitution transition
TPM to user and intruder will create the message based on its database infor-
mation itself. The ‘TPM is Bypassed’ transition is the first enabled transition.
Its input is just a sequence token coming from the previous transition and trans-
fers the flow of tokens to it. When the sequence token reaches the ST3 place,
it randomly chooses either the ‘Forward stored message’ (to fetch one message
from the intruder’s database and send it to the user) or‘Create new message’
(to fetch different fields from the intruder database, create a new message and
send it to the user) transitions to be run. After running either transition the
sequence token will be transmitted to the CSO place and an output token will
be stored in ‘Tmp Received TPM OSAP Response’ place. This token is checked
by the ‘check attack’ transition using fakedxchg2(vosap res) function, figure 15,
to investigate whether it is faked by the intruder or whether it is a genuine
message created by TPM. When the token is faked by the intruder, fakedxchg2
function puts a token with the colour set of csATTACK and posattack value in
the ‘int2 change’ place. The final token will be sent to the user from ‘Received
TPM OSAP Response place as an output port.
The latter path is when the TPM sends a response of the TPM OSAP in-
struction to the user. This response will be stored in the ‘Sent TPM OSAP
Response’ place. The ‘Store Whole message in DB’ transition puts the whole
input token into the intruder’s database. After that, the ‘Store message parts in
DB’ transition will be enabled to store message parts in the intruder’s database
using ‘inToken ah’, ‘inToken ne’ and ‘inToken ne osap’ places. Then the se-
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Fig. 14. Intruder 2 substitution transition
fun fakedxchg2 (vosap_res:csOSAP_RESPONSE): csATTACK =
case vosap_res of
(ahi, ni1, ni1) => posattack
| (ahi, ni1, ni2) => posattack
| (ahi, ni2, ni1) => posattack
| (ahi, ni2, ni2) => posattack
| _ => negattack;
Fig. 15. Function fakedxchg2
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quence token will be moved to the ‘ST3’ place. The following parts of the model
are similar to the models illustrated before.
modeling ‘Process TPM OSAP Response’ substitution transition
The TPM response to the OSAP command will be processed by ‘Process TPM OSAP
Response’ user substitution transition. Its CPN model is shown in page ‘U2’, fig-
ure 16. It demonstrates how different parts of input token, are stored in suitable
places and fusion sets.
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Fig. 16. ‘Process TPM OSAP Response’ CPN model.
The next step is creating the shared secret by user. The ‘Create Shared Secret
User’, figure 17, substitution transition does this.
modeling ‘Create Shared Secret User’
This substitution transition generates the shared secret and puts it in the ‘SHARED
SECRET USER’ place. The shared secret is generated based on content of ‘AU-
THDATA PKH USER’, ne osap user and no osap user places. The CSI place is
used to move the current state token of model to the ‘GENERATE SHARED SE-
CRET USER’ . The CSO place stores the next state token of the model,user41,
in the GF seq global fusion set. The current sequence of the protocol is moved to
the ‘GENERATE SHARED SECRET USER’ by ‘Start creating Shared Secret’
place and then will be moved to the next transitions by ‘Start Seq 3’ .
modeling TPM CreateWrapKey(...) substitution transition
TPM CreateWrapKey(...) is the next substitution transition from the user side
to be run. It produces the following message:
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Fig. 17. ‘Create Shared Secret User’CPN model
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Fig. 18. ‘Create Shared Secret User’ CPN model
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TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne)⊕
newauth), hmacS(ne, no, ...)
Figure 19 demonstrates page U4 containing the whole model.
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Fig. 19. TPM CreateWrapKey(...) CPN model.
To simplify modeling, Create XOR substitution transition, produces the SHA1(S, ne)⊕
newauth part of message. Its model is designed in page U4 1, figure 20. In
this page ‘Create XOR WrapKey’ transition fetches the required tokens from
‘new auth’, ‘SHARED SECRET USER’ and ‘ne user’ places. The created re-
sult will be sent to the ‘xor output’ place then using the output port the result
is sent back to the ‘xor result’ place in page U4 and will be used to create other
parts of the message exchange.
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Fig. 20. Create XOR CPN model.
The Prepare TPM CreateWrapKey substitution transition, figure 21, pro-
duces
TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne)⊕ newauth)
part of message. The result of Create XOR is sent to ‘Prepare TPM CreateWrapKey’
substitution transition using the ‘xor result ’ input port. The ah, pkh and no
are provided by ah user, pkh user and no user places. The result is stored in
‘WrapKey SHA’ . This token will remain in WrapKey SHA till the other part,
hmacS(ne, no, ...), has been created.
The ‘Compute HMAC’ transition produces hmacS(ne, no, ...). The detailed
model is shown in page U4 3, figure 22. Like the previous models, required inputs
are provided from ‘ne osap user’, ‘SHARED SECRET USER’ and ‘no user’
places. The result is sent to page U4, figure 19 and will be stored in hmac S 1
place. The ‘Send TPM CreateWrapKey Message’ transition can now be enabled
to store the result in ‘TPM CreateWrapKey Packet’ . The provided output port
will move the token to the ‘TPM CreateWrapKey Sent Packet’ place in Session 1
page of the model. The token can be intercepted by the Intruder 3 .
modeling Intruder 3 substitution transition
The functionalities of the Intruder 3, figure 23, is exactly the same as previ-
ous intruders functionalities. The intruder at first, stores the complete message,
TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne)⊕newauth), hmacS(ne, no, ...),
in its database. Then the intruder starts storing smaller parts of a message re-
cursively. The TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne)⊕newauth)
and hmacS(ne, no, ...) parts are processed separately.
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Fig. 23. Intruder 3 CPN model
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The hmacS(ne, no, ...) is stored completely in fihmac output field of the in-
truder’s database. Its arguments S, n and noare stored in fiss and finonce in the
intruder’s database fields respectively.
The complete TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne)⊕newauth)
message is stored in fiwrapkey input field of intruder’s database in parallel with
hmac. However, its parts are stored after the hmac components. The ah, pkh and
nowill be stored in fiauth handle, fipubkh and finonce in fields of the database
respectively. Then SHA1(S, ne) ⊕ newauth will be stored in fixor output field.
The transition ‘extract XOR fields’ will put S, ne and newauth in the defined
fiss, finonce in and finewauth database fields.
The end of storing messages is the start of producing new messages to be
sent to the TPM or bypassing it. When the sequence token is in state ST6 the
run of ‘Bypass TPM’ transition moves the token flow to the Intruder 4 substitu-
tion transition in page Session 1 . However, if ‘Forward stored message’ is to be
enabled a message is fetched from fiwrapkey msg field of the intruder’s database
and will be sent to the TPM. The selection of ‘Int create new exchange 3’ substi-
tution transition produces a new message based on the intruder’s knowledge and
sends it to the TPM. The CPN model of this transition is designed in Int 3 1
page and is shown in figure 24.
The operation of Int 3 1 page is similar to page U4 designed for TPM CreateWrapKey(...).
At first SHA1(S, ne) ⊕ newauth) part of faked message is reproduced by Cre-
ate XOR WrapKey transition. The required inputs are fetched from the intruder
fiss, finonce1 and finewauth database fields. The result will be used to produce
TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne) ⊕ newauth) part. The ah,
pkh and no are fetched from the fiauth handle, fipubkh and finonce1 fields. The
result is temporarily stored in WrapKey SHA place till ‘Generate HMAC S 1’
computes hmacS(ne, no, ...) by fetching required parameters from finonce1, fiss
and finonce2 database fields and stores the result in hmac S 1 place. The send
transition combines tokens of both WrapKey SHA and hmac S 1 places to pro-
duce the final message, TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne) ⊕
newauth), hmacS(ne, no, ...). This message is stored in ‘TPM CreateWrapKey
Packet’ place and finally will be sent to the Int 3 page using the output port of
TPM CreateWrapKey place. Storing tpm4 token in CSO place will change the
global state of model. The ‘End create Exchg’ place by receiving the tpm4 token
from end place finishes the Int 3 1 page and returns to the Int3 page.
The produced tokens by both ‘Forward stored message’ and ‘Int create new
exchange 3’ transitions are stored in ‘tmp TPM CreateWrapKey Received Packet’
place. The ‘check attack’ transition by calling fakedxchg3(vwrapkey msg), 25,
ML-function investigates whether the third message sequence of protocol is faked
or not. If the packet is faked a posattack token will be put in the ‘int3 change’
place. Then the produced packet is stored in ‘TPM CreateWrapKey Received
Packet’ and then will be sent to the ‘TPM CreateWrapKey Received Packet’
place in the Session 1 page using the output port. This packet is processed by
‘Process TPM CreateWrapKey message’ that its model is shown in T4 page.
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fun fakedxchg3 (vwrapkey_msg:csWRAPKEY_MSG) : csATTACK =
case vwrapkey_msg of
((ahi, pkh_i, ni1, ((authdatai, ni1, ni1), ni1, authdatai)),
((authdatai, ni1, ni1), ni1, ni2)) => posattack
| _ => negattack;
Fig. 25. fakedxchg3(...) ML-Function
modeling ‘Process TPM CreateWrapKey message’ substitution
transition
This page, figure 26,is the forth processing page of TPM. It processes the TPM CreateWrapKey(....)
message and stores its input parameters in specified places. The TPM does not
need the exact amount of input parameters like ah and can find them in its mem-
ory. Thus the CPN model of T4 just stores TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne)⊕
newauth) and hmacS(ne, no, ...). The ‘Retrieve no’ transition stores hmacS(ne, no, ...)
in hmac S user place and TPM CreateWrapKey(ah, pkh, no, ..., SHA1(S, ne)⊕
newauth) in ‘tmp Wrapkey’ place. The no nonce, used by TPM to produce last
message of protocol, is extracted by ‘extract no’ transition and will be stored in
no TPM place. The TPM creates final message and sends it to the user in ‘Send
TPM CreateWrapKey Response’ transition.
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Fig. 26. Process TPM CreateWrapKey message CPN model
modeling ‘Send TPM CreateWrapKey Response’ substitution
transition
In this page, figure 27, at first hmacS(n
′
e, no, ...) is generated by ‘Generate
HMAC S 2’ place. To generate it S from shared secret TPM, n′e from ne1 TPM
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and no from no TPM fusion sets are fetched. The result is stored in ‘hmac s 2 TPM’
place. The ‘Generate HMAC S 2’ transition is enabled when [vseq=tpm5] is
evaluated to TRUE . A double arc provides access of this transition to the se-
quence token to make [vseq=tpm5] evaluation possible. The sequence token is
used by other transitions of this page thus double arc is used to return the token
back to its original place, GF seq global fusion set.
The other required tokens, n′e and keyblob, are provided by ne1 TPM b and
keyblob TPM places. They will be combined with hmac s 2 TPM place token to
produce the final message, keyblob, n′e, hmacS(n
′
e, no, ...). The final token will be
stored in ‘TPM CreateWrapKey Response’ place and using the output port will
be sent to the ‘TPM CreateWrapKey Sent Response’ place in Session 1 page.
The next transition that will be enabled is Intruder 4 .
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Fig. 27. Send TPM CreateWrapKey Response CPN model
modeling Intruder 4 substitution transition
This page like the other intruder pages illustrates the functionality of intruder.
The n′e and keyblob parts of the input message at first are stored in fikey-
blob and finonce in fields of the intruder’s database by ‘Store message parts
in DB’ transition. In the next step the transition ‘Store whole hmac’ stores
the hmacS(n
′
e, no, ...) part of the input in fihmac output field of database. Then
Analysis of OSAP using CPN 33
‘Store hmac parts in DB’ is enabled to store hmac parts in the database. Thus,
S , n′e and no will be stored in fiss, finonce in and finonce in database fields
respectively. Then ‘Store Whole message in DB’ transition is enabled and the
complete keyblob, n′e, hmacS(n
′
e, no, ...) is stored in the intruder database fiwrap-
key rsp field.
The sequence control after storing the input message and its parts reaches to
the ST5 place. The existence of one token in ST5 can enable one of the ‘Forward
stored token’ or ‘Create new exchange’ transitions. If ‘Forward stored token’
be enabled one message is fetched by the intruder from its database and will be
forwarded to the user. The movement of sequence token from ST5 toward ‘Create
new exchange’ causes a new token based on the intruder knowledge be faked and
sent to the user. To produce this faked token ’Generate output HMAC’ transition
produces the hmacS(n
′
e, no, ...) and ’Create new exchange’ transition creates the
final message, keyblob, n′e, hmacS(n
′
e, no, ...). The required fields are retrieved
from the fiss, finonce1, finonce2, finonce1 and fikeyblob database fields using
‘outToken hmac SS’, ‘outToken hmac ne1’ , ‘outToken hmac no’, ‘outToken ne’
and ‘outToken keyblob’ places. These places are members of GF intDB global
fusion set that creates the intruder’s database knowledge.
The sequence control token can move to the ST5 place from ‘TPM is By-
passed’ transition. In this case Intruder 3 has bypassed the TPM in the previ-
ous exchange and has directly sent the flow of messages to the Intruder 4 . The
method of moving tokens to the ST5 place does not change the flow of running
other transitions. All the time after getting token by ST5 either a new message
will be faked and sent to the user or a complete stored message in the database
will be fetched and forwarded to the user. The final created message by the
intruder is stored in the ‘TPM CreateWrapKey Response’ place. Then ‘check
attack’ is run to check whether new message is completely faked by intruder (all
the fields are created by the intruder) or not. As the result of a faked message,
function fakedxchg4(vwrapkey rsp) puts a token with the value of posattack in
‘int4 change’ place. Otherwise a token with negattack value is inserted in the
‘int4 change’ place. The final message is stored in ‘TPM CreateWrapKey final
Response’ place and using the output port it will be sent to the Session 1 page.
In this page the response will be stored in ‘TPM CreateWrapKey Rec Response’
place and then is finally processed by ‘Process TPM CreateWrapKey(...) Re-
sponse’ substitution transition.
modeling ‘Process TPM CreateWrapKey(...) Response’ substitution
transition
This page, figure 28, like other pages, processes the input token and its fields are
put in different places. The input token comes from the ‘TPM CreateWrapKey
Response’ input port and is stored in ‘Whole rsp msg’ place. Its keyblob, n′e and
hmacS(n
′
e, no, ...) parts are stored in ‘keyblob user’, ne1 user and hmac s 2 user
places respectively. The ‘Retreive WrapKey Response fields’ transition after de-
composing the input token puts an endses token in CSO place to indicate that
the protocol is finalized and there is no more transitions. An emtpy token is put
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in ‘End WrapKey Proc’ place. This token is sent to the Session 1 page from
output port and is stored in the ‘End Session 1’ place. The existence of a token
in Session 1 page demonstrates that the protocol has finished.
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Fig. 28. Process TPM CreateWrapKey(...) ResponseCPN model
4 Verification of the model using state-space
Simulation of a CPN model just analyses a finite number of executions. This
helps validating, detecting and finding errors of CPN model as well as increasing
confidence about the model. It can demonstrate model is working correctly.
However, using that it is impossible to guarantee correctness of model with
100% of certainty because all the possible executions are not covered[16].
Full state space calculates all possible executions of the model. It calculates
all reachable markings and binding elements of the CPN model. The result is
represented in a directed graph where its nodes are set of reachable markings
and the arcs are corresponding to the occurring binding elements.
In this research the CPN/Tools state space is used to evaluate the authenti-
cation property of OSAP CPN model.
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4.1 Authentication property
The designed CPN model in this research checks the authentication property
of OSAP protocol. To check this property any sent and received message is
checked by the model to find whether it is faked by the intruder or not. If
the TPM is bypassed in transitions number 2 and 4, or what is sent to the
TPM in transitions 1 and 3 is faked by intruder it means that authentication
property is violated. If any message is faked by the intruder it means that the
authentication property is violated. This illustration can be formulated as fol-
lows: CS = {colourseti | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, k is the number of defined colour sets in
CPN model CS(f i) : colourset of f i field, i ≥ 1 CS(fmi ):colour set of the i-th
field of message m F = {∀f i | 1 ≤ i ≤ l, AND CS(f i) ∈ CS}, l is the number
of defined fields in the CPN model
M(n) = {∨ni=1fi | (fi ∈ F )}: any message M with n fields is the union of n
different fields and each field is a member of F
M ′(h) =
{∨hj=1f ′j | (f ′j ∈ F )}: any message M ′ with h fields is the union of
h different fields and each field is a member of F
equivalency : m ≡ m′ iff m ∈ M(n) AND m′ ∈ M ′(h) AND n =
h AND ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,CS(fmi ) = CS(fm
′
i )
MA,B : Message M sent from A to B
MB,A : Message M sent from B to A
MI,A : Message M sent from intruder I to principal A
MI,B : Message M sent from intruder I to principal B
Authentication property definition:
O : the number of messages sent from principal A to principal B P : the num-
ber of messages sent from principal B to principal A M iA,B : thei thmessagesentfromAtoB
M iB,A : thei thmessagesentfromBtoA Authentication property is hold iff (∀oi=1M iA,B ,@MI,B |
M iA,B ≡MI,B)AND(∀Pi=1M iB,A,@MI,A |M iB,A ≡MI,A)
To check the authentication property, four different functions are imple-
mented. They are all shown in figure 29.
This definition of authentication can be used for any protocol. It only checks
whether a message is sent from an authentic source or not. However, for OSAP
when authentication property is violated both of (1 and 3) or (1 and 4) exchanges
are faked by the intruder. Thus in the ASK-CTL formula both of the situations
are checked.
4.2 using ASK-CTL for validating OSAP authentication property
The ASK-CTL formula is used to check authentication property of the OSAP
protocol. There are two different situations that if any of them happens the
authentication property will be violated:
1. When the intruder has bypassed the TPM and based on its knowledge in
database has faked 2 and 4 message exchanges. The marking of the model
in this situation is shown in figure 30
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fun fakedxchg1 (vosap_msg: csOSAP_MSG):csATTACK =
case vosap_msg of
(pkh_i, ni1) => posattack
| (pkh_i, ni2) => posattack
| _ => negattack;
fun fakedxchg2 (vosap_res:csOSAP_RESPONSE): csATTACK =
case vosap_res of
(ahi, ni1, ni1) => posattack
| (ahi, ni1, ni2) => posattack
| (ahi, ni2, ni1) => posattack
| (ahi, ni2, ni2) => posattack
| _ => negattack;
fun fakedxchg3 (vwrapkey_msg:csWRAPKEY_MSG) : csATTACK =
case vwrapkey_msg of
((ahi, pkh_i, ni1, ((authdatai, ni1, ni1), ni1, authdatai)),
((authdatai, ni1, ni1), ni1, ni2)) => posattack
| _ => negattack;
fun fakedxchg4 (vwrapkey_rsp:csWRAPKEY_RESPONSE) : csATTACK =
case vwrapkey_rsp of
(keyblobi, ni1, ((authdatai, ni1, ni2), ni1, ni2)) => posattack
| _ => negattack;
Fig. 29. Function to check first exchange of the protocol
2. When the intruder does not bypass the TPM but it is able to fake all the
messages sent from user to the TPM. In this case not only message exchanges
number 2 and 4 but also number 1 and 3 are faked by the intruder. The
marking of the model in these situations is shown in figure 31.
Marking(Mi, P
Int 2
int2 change) = 1‘posattack AND Marking(Mi, P
Int 4
int4 change) =
1‘posattack AND EndSession
{
Marking(Mi, P
U5
CSO)
}
= 1‘endses =
FakedExchange2 4(Mi)
Fig. 30. Marking of the CPN model when authentication property is violated by by-
passing TPM in 2 and 4 exchanges
To check these situations the ASL-CTL formula of figure 32 is written:
The first line of the SML formula opens the ASK/CTL library. Line 2 defines
function FakedExchange2 4 to find is there any state in the state space that at
least one token is available in int1 change and int3 change places or not. When
this function is TRUE the marking of figure 30 can be found in the occurrence
graph. Line 3 defines function FakedExchange1 3 to find whether at least in
one marking both of the 1 and 3 exchanges have been faked by the intruder or
not. When this function is evaluated to TRUE, one marking in the occurrence
graph can be found that both of the exchanges are faked. The marking of the
OG in this situation is shown in figure 31. The EndSession function (line 4)
by checking the number of tokens with the value of endses in CSO place of
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int1 change) = 1‘posattack AND
Marking(Mi, P
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int3 change) = 1‘posattack AND
EndSession
{
Marking(Mi, P
U5
CSO)
}
= 1‘endses = FakedExchange1 3(Mi)
Fig. 31. Marking of the CPN model when authentication property is violated by by-
passing TPM in 1 and 3 exchanges
01 use (ogpath^"ASKCTL/ASKCTLloader.sml");
02 fun FakedExchange2_4 n = cf (posattack, Mark.Int_2’int2_change 1 n) > 0 andalso cf
(posattack, Mark.Int_4’int4_change 1 n) > 0 ;
03 fun FakedExchange1_3 n = cf (posattack, Mark.Int_1’int1_change 1 n) > 0 andalso cf
(posattack, Mark.Int_3’int3_change 1 n) > 0 ;
04 fun EndSession n = cf (endses, Mark.U5’CSO 1 n) > 0;
05 val TransitionsFaked2_4 = NF ("", FakedExchange2_4);
06 val TransitionsFaked1_3 = NF ("", FakedExchange1_3);
07 val SessionEnds = NF ("", EndSession);
08 val myASKCTLformula = POS (OR(AND(TransitionsFaked2_4, SessionEnds),
AND(AND(TransitionsFaked1_3, TransitionsFaked2_4),
SessionEnds))) ;
09 eval_node myASKCTLformula InitNode;
Fig. 32. ASK-CTL-formula
the page U9 determines whether the protocol has finished or not. The node
function (NF) in lines 5,6 and 7 evaluates FakedExchange2 4, FakedExchange1 3
and EndSession functions. The result which is TRUE or FALSE will be stored in
TransitionsFaked2 4, TransitionsFaked1 3 and SessionEnds. The POS function
in line 8 checks either the first situation of authentication property or the second
situation is violated or not. This condition is shown in figure 33. The last line of
SML code evaluates the myASKCTLformula starting from InitNode.
POS(FakedExchange2 4(Mi) AND EndSession)OR[(FakedExchange1 3(Mi)
AND FakedExchange2 4(Mi)) AND EndSession]
Fig. 33. ML function to check the authentication property of OSAP
5 Conclusion and future works
This research analyses the OSAP protocol using CPN. The results of the analysis
shows that authentication property of this protocol can be violated. This model
is designed based on [6] assumptions. The analysis can be done by different
assumptions to study the protocol in more detail.
The used approach can be applied for other security properties such as se-
crecy. Analyzing other properties needs a few refinements in the model to add
required place, transitions and colour sets. It is necessary to write new ASK/CTL
formulas to validate results.
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The designed attacker model based on Dolev-Yao aproach can be replaced
by other models. However, this replacement needs lots of changes in the model
that requires more efforts and times. Because the Dolev-Yao attacker model is
the most powerful and popular attacker model used in analyzing protocols, it is
not recommended to change it.
The OSAP protocol is just a part of trusted computing protocols. As men-
tioned earlier one of the advantages of using CPN for modeling is its ability to
compose different models. This makes CPN a solution for composing OSAP with
other trusted computing protocols and analyze the created model.
The main disadvantage of using CPN in modeling is its firm connection with
protocol structure. In the created model any inconsiderable change in protocol
and its messages structure can cause lots of changes in the CPN model. It leads
to inevitable cascaded changes in the CPN model. However, this firm connection
helps the designers of the model to be more familiar with the protocol specifica-
tions. Specifications can be compared with their implementations to investigate
whether they are compliant with each other or not .
6 Previous works
Coloured Petri Nets have been used by [12] for analyzing cryptographic proto-
cols. They have modeled each legitimate protocol entity and intruder using Petri
Net Objects(PNO). Intruder can do a variety of actions. Ultimate goal of the
analysis is to determine whether protocol can withstand intruder attacks and
actions or not. The large number of attacks that intruder may pursue makes
hand analysis impossible. The Prolog is used for analysis in this research. This
research provides a model for handset authentication protocol used in CT2 and
CT2Plus wireless authentication protocols and analyzes them.
The Station-to-Station (STS) security protocol is analyzed in [2] using CPN.
The authors use CPN to model all the protocol objects and intruder. They
deduce describing protocol entities and its attacker using CPN provides a solid
foundation for protocol analysis. However, other analysis approaches do not offer
these features.
Al-Azzoni in [1] has used a hierarchical CPN model to analyze TMN key
exchange protocol. The proposed approach at first models TMN entities. The
intruder CPN model is designed and added to the protocol model in the next
step. The Design/CPN tool is used to analyze the created model. Concept of
DB-place is introduced to simplify representation of the intruder’s knowledge.
Application of the token passing scheme is used to resolve the problem of state
space explosion that during the simulation in Design/CPN occurs. The Al-Azzoni
approach is used for this research. Moreover, a current state token mechanism
is used to determine current page of the model that should be run. In this
mechanism a guard is added to transitions of a nominated page. This gurad
enables transitions just when container page of transition is the active page
of model. This mechanism is implemented using GF seq global fusion set and
csSEQ colour set.
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